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11 INDETERMINISM AND PLURALISM IN 
NATURE: FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY 
AND THEOLOGY
Claudia E. Vanney
Th e relationship between determinism and freedom has been one of the main 
concerns in philosophy throughout history. Many philosophers have opposed 
freedom (or chance) to necessity (or causality) when discussing whether free-
dom is present or not in the connection between processes and their results, as 
a way to diff erentiate between necessary (or causal) processes and free (or ran-
dom) processes. Diff erent defi nitions and notions have been used in the debates 
over determinism. On the one hand, the terms contingency, randomness, emer-
gency, uncertainty, free will and freedom seem to point to an indeterministic 
position on reality. On the other hand, the notions of necessity, causation, law-
likeness, predictability and fatalism seem to suggest a deterministic stance. But 
does science properly distinguish between these notions? If so, how does it do 
this? Furthermore, how does philosophy contribute towards the elucidation of 
such distinctions? Does a deterministic or an indeterministic world view aff ect 
theological thought?
In the deterministic view, everything that has happened (past), everything 
that happens (present) and everything that will happen (future) is already deter-
mined, conditioned or established. During the classical and medieval periods, 
determinism had a metaphysical connotation, derived from the principle of 
universal causation. In modern times, however, deterministic conceptions laid 
their theoretical foundations in scientifi c knowledge and were associated with 
the notions of prediction and law-likeness. Paradigmatic mechanistic deter-
minism regarded the world as a great clockwork-like system. Since time is the 
independent variable in the dynamical equations of mechanics, it is possible to 
describe every mechanical process as a temporal succession of diff erent possible 
states. Th us, mechanistic determinism conceived that physical systems inexora-
bly evolve from an initial state.
During the twentieth century, the scientifi c world view distanced itself 
considerably from the deterministic image of the clockwork-like world, thus 
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136 Latin American Perspectives on Science and Religion
assuming new modalities. On the one hand, the development of chaos theory 
turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle for those who aspired to anticipate 
a univocal prediction of all future states in all real systems.1 On the other hand, 
the consolidation of quantum mechanics has called for a revision of classic deter-
minism insofar as it introduces randomness in the fundamental strata of reality.2 
Th ereaft er, a new indeterministic paradigm was progressively introduced in 
diff erent areas of physics and other sciences, changing the vision of the world 
and also aff ecting the specifi c objectives of science. In the emergence of quan-
tum mechanics, some authors saw the death of determinism. Others preferred 
to circumvent the problem by adopting an instrumentalist position. Finally, a 
minority assumed that quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory and postu-
lated the possibility of a broader formulation that would recover determinism.
Th e deterministic proposals are still in force, however, and should not be iden-
tifi ed with classical mechanistic determinism. Nowadays, determinism assumes 
diff erent meanings depending on whether it is applied to the universe as a whole 
(regularities of nature), to our knowledge (predictability) or to the dynamical 
equation of movement (laws of science). Indeed, several contemporary authors 
consider determinism to be only a property of scientifi c theories. Nevertheless, 
setting the precise way in which the diff erent theories are related to one another 
is still an open problem. Discussions over the relationship between micro- and 
macro-evolutions in physics and biology have also revealed the tension between 
reductionist and anti-reductionist comprehensions of science. While reduction-
ists believe that determinism/indeterminism is resolved at the fundamental 
level, anti-reductionists accept the possibility of a simultaneous coexistence of 
deterministic and indeterministic descriptions in diff erent strata of reality.
Far from being a resolved issue, the debate over the determinism/indeter-
minism of the natural world has opened new perspectives on philosophical 
discussions. On the one hand, the distinction between determinism and predict-
ability has led to deeper research into the relationship between ontological and 
gnoseological realms. On the other hand, the multiple descriptions proposed by 
contemporary science cannot avoid the question of the cognitive status of the 
various scientifi c formulations and the possibility of a coexistence of determinis-
tic and indeterministic views. Furthermore, many authors suggest the necessity 
of an ontological indeterminism in order to admit a divine action in nature; this 
is a proposal with broad implications in natural theology.
In this chapter, I shall present some philosophical ideas suggested by Leonardo 
Polo which could shed new light on the aforementioned questions. Polo (1926–
2013) was a Spanish philosopher still largely unknown in English-speaking 
academic circles but whose ideas have awakened an increasing interest over recent 
years in several academic environments in Spain and also in Latin America. On 
this continent, Polo participated in fruitful academic activity – particularly in 
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Mexico, Colombia and Peru – and supported incipient intellectual groups in a 
number of diff erent countries.
Polo’s thought is not anchored in any philosophical school exclusively; it 
builds upon many previous philosophical proposals which merit further inter-
pretation. Polo holds the conviction that philosophy, for the same reason that it 
does not exhaust its fi rst inspiration, is a kind of knowledge that always allows 
further development. Polo’s regard for science, as with his profound openness 
towards transcendence, makes his philosophy a useful platform for dealing with 
the diff erent topics of science and religion. His proposals have not yet been 
studied in-depth but they off er an original and inspirational starting point for 
future studies. With Polo in mind, I propose that the recognition of a variety of 
cognitive acts represents a suitable approach to the illumination of the determin-
ism/indeterminism debate of the natural world. In my opinion, Polo’s theory of 
knowledge not only enables a more precise formulation of the terms used in this 
discussion but also establishes a broader framework for a more fruitful interdis-
ciplinary dialogue.
Th e Emergence of a New Indeterministic Paradigm
Th e development of complex sciences during the twentieth century has put 
mechanistic determinism to the test. Th e coexistence – in chaotic systems – of 
non-lineal deterministic laws, together with the uncertainty of the initial condi-
tions of the physical system, has made it impossible to have univocal predictions 
of the temporal evolution of each of the many particles in a real system. Although 
we can estimate the temporal evolution of the initial imprecisions of diff erent 
variables, the fi nal uncertainties depend largely on the characteristics of the 
equations of movement. When the equations which govern the temporal evolu-
tion of a physical system are linear, the predictions about their evolution are kept 
within a limited range. In complex systems, however, the uncertainty about the 
initial state of the system makes it impossible to predict the temporal evolution 
of each of the particles within the system. Given that, in complex systems the 
movement of particles is governed by equations which are very sensitive to the 
initial conditions, the trajectories that follow two points which are initially very 
close, diverge exponentially (and not linearly) with the passing of time.3
Nevertheless, it is still possible to maintain determinism in chaotic systems, 
but this requires a particular interpretation.4 Since future states in a complex 
system can be statistically predicted from a holistic perspective, the appar-
ently random macroscopic processes can be interpreted as the answers given by 
underlying microscopic, deterministic laws that are responsible for restoring the 
univocal temporal dependence between the states. If we consider that the only 
function of statistics is to allow for the treatment of very complex systems with 
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138 Latin American Perspectives on Science and Religion
a great degree of freedom, probability may be seen as an expression of our igno-
rance of perfectly deterministic processes that result from an infi nite number of 
unobservable elements.5
When we consider determinism/indeterminism as an intrinsic property of 
nature we are faced with an ontological problem. From the study of the temporal 
evolution of chaotic systems, however, a new interpretation of indeterminism 
which highlights gnoseological aspects may also emerge. From this viewpoint, 
indeterminism is not a property of nature but a manifestation that we lack suf-
fi cient information of in order to determine the dynamical evolution of certain 
systems. Th at is, gnoseological indeterminism primarily reinforces the limitation 
of our cognitive capacity. Th is indeterminacy can be compatible with an onto-
logical determinism, but this determinism remains unknowable for us.
Th is broadening of perspective made it possible to separate the notions of 
law-likeness and predictability, which are inherent properties of the mechanistic 
determinism.6 Th e deterministic laws govern the dynamical evolution of com-
plex systems, so that each state is rigidly determined by the previous state. Th e 
evolution of each particle, however, can only be predicted with some degree 
of probability. Th e diffi  culty of predicting future states of the particles which 
compose the system can be interpreted in two ways. First, as the revelation of 
an ontological indeterminism in nature. Second, as a measurement of our igno-
rance about the perfect deterministic process which each individual microscopic 
particle, whose behaviour we know only through statistical procedures, follows.
Ontological, Gnoseological and Scientifi c Determinism
Until relatively recently, the consideration of a constant and univocal succes-
sion of events that constitute the history of the universe was always implicit in 
deterministic conceptions, without making any reference to methodological or 
epistemological issues. During the last century, however, the notion of deter-
minism was also addressed from the perspective of the analysis of language and 
today many authors consider determinism to be a property of scientifi c theories, 
understanding the latter as a deductively closed set of statements of a formal 
language. Nevertheless, as the term determinism applies to diverse entities, I 
think that it is useful to distinguish between the diff erent meanings of this con-
cept.7 Firstly, ontological determinism considers the predicate ‘deterministic’ to 
be applicable to the universe as a whole. Scientifi c laws governing the behav-
iour of real systems are regularities inscribed in the ontological realm. Th us, 
ontological determinism is a property of nature. Secondly, gnoseological deter-
minism assumes that the predicate ‘deterministic’ applies to our knowledge of 
the dynamical evolution of a system. Th is meaning identifi es determinism with 
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predictability. Consequently, gnoseological determinism is a property of our 
knowledge. Finally, scientifi c determinism considers the predicate ‘deterministic’ 
applicable to the dynamical equations that univocally govern the evolution of 
physical systems. From this standpoint, the aim of science is to describe real sys-
tems through deterministic equations. Th us, scientifi c determinism is a property 
of scientifi c theories.
Nevertheless, if we attempt to draw ontological conclusions about a physical 
system from an exclusively formal analysis, some diffi  culties are bound to emerge. 
Th e laws of physics describe the time evolution of physical systems through a 
system of diff erential equations which governs the behaviour of several variables 
over time. It is usually thought that dynamical equations of motion are determin-
istic when a given value of independent variables univocally fi xes the dynamical 
evolution of a physical system in any given state. In this way, the deterministic 
character of a given scientifi c theory, or the lack of it, will usually be associated 
with the possibility of fi nding unique solutions for dynamical equations: if these 
possible solutions are not unique, there will be no determinism.8
In accordance with this criterion, some authors have tried to classify diverse 
theories into deterministic or indeterministic categories.9 Th is is by no means 
an easy task to accomplish, since each of the diff erent theories includes diff er-
ent concepts – such as ‘system’ or ‘state’ – which are frequently not defi ned 
with the necessary precision. Hence, even within each theory there will be an 
open space to formulate legitimately a notion of determinism in diff erent ways, 
thus requiring an interpretative discernment so as to choose the best formula-
tion in each case.10 In order to ascertain the determinism or indeterminism in a 
given scientifi c theory, it is necessary to adopt a metatheoretical epistemological 
perspective, and this calls for moving towards an in-depth study of the kind of 
reasoning behind scientifi c theories. For example, the measurement problem in 
quantum theory seems to disclose very clearly the indeterminism of this theory. 
Since the deterministic approaches have always assumed the existence of a uni-
vocal connection between the properties of a physical system throughout time, 
the measurement problem reveals a peculiarity of quantum systems: they do not 
possess all their properties defi ned in each instant. Nevertheless (and despite 
the fact that quantum physics has a large number of successful predictions), the 
understanding of the theory is not yet clear enough, since there are several diff er-
ent interpretations of quantum mechanics.11
Nowadays, most interpretations of quantum physics favour an indetermin-
istic framework. Even though there are also new deterministic interpretations 
of quantum mechanics, such as Bohm’s,12 in 1964 Bell’s theorem proved that it 
is not possible that a deterministic and local theory of hidden variables which 
reproduced the correlations that Bohm predicted could exist.13 Bell’s theoretical 
arguments were empirically confi rmed by Aspect some years later, thus bringing 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 O
xf
or
d]
 at
 05
:23
 15
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
16
 
140 Latin American Perspectives on Science and Religion
relevant elements against a deterministic and local interpretation of quantum 
results.14 It has not yet been resolved, however, whether the most recent inter-
pretations of quantum physics favour an ontological or an epistemological 
indeterminism, since quantum mechanics could either introduce an ontological 
indeterminism in microphysics, or quantum probabilities may simply be a sign 
of our ignorance of the quantum world.
Reduction
Even current scientifi c theories with wide acceptance among researchers usually 
contain philosophical problems regarding their foundations which are related 
to topics of interpretation – a paradigmatic example is quantum mechanics – 
or inter-theoretic articulation. For example, we have seen that highly unstable 
dynamical systems are deterministic in a microscopic description, but they are 
indeterministic in a macroscopic one. In the debate between determinism and 
indeterminism in the natural world, the dilemma between a reductionist and 
an anti-reductionist understanding of science is also present. Reductionist posi-
tions usually attribute determinism/indeterminism to the most fundamental 
level. Anti-reductionists, in turn, accept a simultaneous coexistence of diff erent 
theoretic formulations in diff erent strata of reality. For this second position, the 
diff erent scientifi c theories do not off er a unitary image of the world.15
In the fi rst half of the twentieth century, the reductionist programme intended 
to reduce all scientifi c theories to only one, regarded as fundamental.16 Within 
this programme, it is possible to distinguish diff erent kinds of reductionism: (1) 
semantic reductionism (the language of the reduced scientifi c fi eld is translated 
into the language of the reducing fi eld); (2) inter-theoretic reductionism (the laws 
of the reduced theory are deduced from the reducing theory); (3) methodological 
reductionism (the method of the reducing theory is the privileged one).17 Besides, 
these reductionisms are usually supported by an ontological reductionism (the 
reducing theory contains the fi eld of reality of the reduced theory).
Th e links between diff erent physical theories usually involve a mathematical 
limit or, inversely, coarse-graining techniques.18 Due to some ‘successful’ cases 
of reduction in the fi eld of physics, reductionism was uncritically assumed on 
several occasions. Th e reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is a 
paradigmatic case. Even ‘successful’ cases, however, continue to pose open prob-
lems: thermodynamics contains fundamental laws which are not t-invariant. 
Th us, how could we explain irreversibility with reversible theories or how could 
an irreversible world be depicted adequately within a reversible theory?19 Quan-
tum mechanics also off ers a good example: the complexity of the problem of 
decoherence shows that to deduce classical mechanics from quantum mechanics 
implies something more than the mere application of a mathematical limit.20
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Th e discussion about the relationship between micro- and macro-evolution 
soon moved from physics to biology. Progress in molecular biology also led 
to new reductionist proposals, which sought to reduce all biological explana-
tions to the domain of molecular biology. Classical genetic reductionism, like 
Monod’s, paved the way for indeterministic perspectives in biology by introduc-
ing chance in its various forms, as a generator of diversity and a mechanism of 
evolution, among others.21 For later determinism, however, it is genes, together 
with environmental conditions, that completely determine the morphology and 
the behaviour of the phenotypes.22 Nevertheless, just as there are no biological 
laws that could be reduced to the laws of molecular biology, genes and DNA 
do not adequately satisfy the criteria of reduction either. At present, there are 
some anti-reductionist biologists who consider the explanations of macrobiol-
ogy appropriate and autonomous enough so as to require neither correction, nor 
completion, nor any additional explanations at the molecular level.23
Cognitive Pluralism
Th e contemporary debate on the determinism/indeterminism of the natu-
ral world has opened up new perspectives on philosophical refl ection. On the 
one hand, the distinction between determinism and predictability permits the 
exploration of how the ontological and the gnoseological domains relate to 
one another. On the other hand, the plurality of descriptions put forward by 
contemporary science raises the question of the cognitive status of diff erent sci-
entifi c formulations. Leonardo Polo’s theory of knowledge could allow access to 
both topics. Between 1984 and 1996, Polo carried out important gnoseologi-
cal clarifi cations which can be found in the four volumes of his Curso de Teoría 
del Conocimiento.24 In Polo’s view, knowledge has two dimensions in perfect 
agreement: one is the cognitive act (methodic dimension) and the other one is 
the content known (thematic dimension). So, knowledge ‘is an act that is uni-
tarily thematic or a theme that is unitarily an act’.25 In other words, no theme 
appears without accounting for the intellectual method that leads to its con-
sideration, and there is no intellectual act which does not delimit its theme in a 
clear way. Polo also distinguishes several kinds of cognitive acts, and he points 
out that no cognitive dimension can be considered absolute. In my opinion, this 
methodic-thematic pluralism not only relates the gnoseological (methodic) to 
the ontological (thematic) realms without confusing them, but also paves the 
way for establishing the cognitive status of the diff erent scientifi c disciplines 
avoiding reduction.26
Extra-mental reality is regarded as diff erent from the known object. What 
is thought is admittedly non-real, since it has no nature of its own apart from 
being an aspectual reference. Th e object is extra-mental reality that is thought 
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142 Latin American Perspectives on Science and Religion
in act, whereas the act of thinking is immanent. Due to its intentionality, the 
object thought ‘does not properly need to be’.27 Th at is, extra-mental principles 
are not like objects or reality. Objectifi cation is not false, but it grants only a 
limited access to what is real, since the order of what is real is not intentional but 
extra-mental. Objectifi cations provide a valid yet insuffi  cient knowledge of real-
ity. Th ey are inevitably multiform because they are aspectual. Since they consist 
of diff erent ways of referring to reality they entail truth, but this is restricted 
to the aspect they refer to. Nonetheless, the aspectual plurality of intentional 
knowledge does not equal the real thing, since it is not possible to reconstruct 
reality by composing diff erent intentionally known aspects. Th is is why numerous 
descriptions of diff erent scientifi c theories do not off er a unitary vision of the 
cosmos, which some reductionists aspire to. Th e unifi cation of reality in terms of 
totality is generated by thought, which introduces uniqueness.
Th erefore, if ontology aspires to have some knowledge of the true principles 
of reality and not just an intentional knowledge, a cognitive method diff erent 
from intentional objectifi cation is required. Polo states that it is possible to 
realize that reality is plural and diverse within itself if an appropriate cognitive 
method is used. He proposes a new method to access knowledge of the real prin-
ciples of the universe, which I shall refer to in more detail below. By applying 
one dimension of his method, and following Aristotle, he recognizes diff erent 
principles or causes in the world: in the universe there is contingency (mate-
rial cause), determination (formal cause), dynamism (effi  cient cause) and order 
(fi nal cause). But these principles do not exist in isolation, they only exist in 
co-causality.28
Indeterminism and Divine Action
Th e discussion of determinism/indeterminism in the natural world is not only a 
concern for epistemology and philosophy of science; it also has strong implica-
tions for natural theology. Many authors have emphasized the fact that processes 
in the world have involved, at all stages of its history, an interplay between chance 
and necessity. For some of them, novelty emerges at the edge of chaos, where 
order and disorder connect without destroying one another.29 A recent research 
programme called ‘Scientifi c Perspectives on Divine Action’ studied how con-
temporary science points to a kind of metaphysical space which can allow for 
divine agency in the world.30 According to researchers of this programme, in 
selecting the laws of nature, God chooses specifi c laws with very remarkable 
properties. Th us, the laws allow not only for chance events but also for the genu-
ine emergence of complexity in nature – an emergence which requires these laws 
but goes far beyond a mere unfolding of their consequences.
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Nevertheless, the need for an ontological indeterminism in order to admit 
a divine action in nature is not at all evident. Some scholars, such as William E. 
Carroll and Ignacio Silva, have pointed out the importance of distinguishing 
between divine action and natural action. If we assume that God acts in nature 
through ‘gaps of indetermination’ or through regions where natural causality is 
not well defi ned, we are employing a univocal notion of causality which hinders 
the metaphysical distinction between divine causality and created causality.
When we consider that God’s actions are like those of natural causes – causes 
in the natural order – some diffi  culties are likely to arise. If God’s causal status is 
reduced to the causal status of any other cause, divine action loses its provident 
character: it is hard to understand how a cause that is just one among others 
could guide the created world towards its fi nal destination. In order to avoid a 
univocal understanding of causality it is possible, for example, to resort to the 
classical notions of primary and secondary causality.31 God is the fi rst cause of 
the eff ect, while agents are secondary causes. So, on the one hand, if we consider 
the causal power thanks to which the action is executed, God is the cause of 
the action of natural agents. On the other hand, the natural agent considered in 
itself is the immediate cause of its eff ect. Th at is, an analogical notion of causal-
ity, instead of a univocal understanding, can refer both to divine and created 
causality, leaving room for the necessary diff erences that preserve God’s tran-
scendence and a provident divine action.
I think that it is also possible to address this question from Polo’s perspec-
tive. I have already mentioned that his gnoseological clarifi cation sheds light on 
the range of scientifi c knowledge. Polo’s philosophical proposal is inspired by the 
purpose of transcending the predominance of conceptual objectivity in knowl-
edge. Th at is, the discovery that ‘uniqueness’ and ‘totality’ belong exclusively to 
the mental realm and are therefore erroneously applied to extra-mental reality. 
Th e awareness of the limits of objectuality triggered a far-reaching philosophi-
cal enterprise, and Polo proposed a method of his own for philosophy, which he 
called the abandonment of the mental limit. Polo decided to look for diff erent ways 
of abandoning that limit in all topics proper to philosophy.32 Th e discrimination 
of the diff erent modes in which objectuality puts being aside makes it possible to 
access both metaphysics and anthropology, while also establishing an important 
distinction between both of them. I shall come back to this distinction later. Polo 
states that, in order to have knowledge of causality, a proper intellectual method is 
needed, one that is diff erent from objectifi cation. Th us, in contrast with what the 
programme ‘Scientifi c Perspectives on Divine Action’ maintains, it would not be 
possible for Polo to access knowledge of God by means of an objectifying knowl-
edge. Th e ‘idea’ of God would be formulated by means of objectifi cation but this 
does not grant knowledge of God as a primary being.
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Polo also distinguishes several real principles, because extra-mental princi-
ples do not all belong to just one kind. We can distinguish the ‘principles of 
principled things’ (principios de las cosas principiadas) – such as the material or 
formal cause – from the act of being as the principle of existence, which Polo calls 
persistence ( persistencia). Philosophy of nature deals with the former, whereas 
metaphysics studies the latter. Th e aforementioned adjustment between method 
and theme also demands diff erent cognitive methods for these philosophical 
disciplines. So, the abandonment of the mental limit in its fi rst dimension is the 
methodological way which Polo proposes in order to access knowledge of a very 
wide range of topics, proper to metaphysics and natural theology, such as the 
awareness of extra-mental existence and of the created condition, among others. 
In particular, Polo’s perspective underlines the transcendence of God.33
Th e four Aristotelian causes are, for Polo, real principles in the predicamental 
order. Th ey are, furthermore, the analysis of one fi rst transcendental principle: 
persistence. But persistence is diff erent from the origin. Th e divine act of being 
is original activity. What is original has always been, whereas what is originated 
has a beginning. Created being is persistence, whereas the Origin is uncreated 
being. Th e creature is a caused cause, whereas God is uncaused and creator of the 
cause. To know extra-mental being – abandoning the limit of thought – means 
to notice the radical dependence of the universe with respect to God; its strict 
character as a creature.
Even though it is not possible to give more details of Polo’s proposal in these 
pages, I think that what has been said is enough to maintain that – according 
to Polo – science, ontology and natural theology approach the study of nature 
through diff erent cognitive methods and, therefore, they result in diff erent kinds 
of knowledge. Nevertheless, the methodic-thematic discrimination suggested by 
Polo does not entail the claim that there would be no communication between 
these disciplines. On the contrary, since these disciplines deal with diff erent 
dimensions, they shed light on one and the same problem from diff erent perspec-
tives. So, scientifi c discoveries can inspire fruitful developments in philosophy 
of nature and natural theology. In an interdisciplinary dialogue, however, only a 
consideration of the cognitive range of the diff erent statements can avoid naïve 
concordisms (for example, between science and religion) and extrapolations that 
lack precision beyond their own fi eld. In my opinion, if diff erent disciplines are to 
engage in a suitable critical dialogue, it is imperative to have a clear epistemologi-
cal frame.
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Indeterminism, Uncertainty, Unpredictability, Freedom
Th e distinction between ontological, gnoseological and scientifi c determin-
ism has already been mentioned above. Th e same distinction between diff erent 
levels of analysis could also refer to indeterminism: ontological indeterminism 
describes an intrinsic property of nature; gnoseological indeterminism indicates 
a characteristic of our knowledge; and scientifi c indeterminism refers to the laws 
of science. In order to avoid an incorrect assimilation of concepts, however, I sug-
gest reserving the use of indeterminism for the ontological realm. Uncertainty, 
in turn, could refer more properly to gnoseological statements. Finally, unpre-
dictability is a notion which has a full meaning in scientifi c contexts. Besides, 
in accordance with Polo’s proposal, we could also say that the indeterminism of 
the natural world confi rms its contingency (understood as a real principle); that 
uncertainty indicates that the human cognitive power is not absolute, and that 
unpredictability points at the limitations of objectifying knowledge in general – 
and of scientifi c knowledge in particular.
Th e problem of determinism unavoidably also aff ects the question of free-
dom, which opens up an anthropological perspective. Classical positions fall 
into compatibilism and incompatibilism,34 even if the magnitude of such a 
distinction has been questioned.35 While various compatibilists claim that a 
deterministic system leaves room for free will,36 incompatibilists deny such a 
statement.37 Among these, libertarians say that free will is real but presupposes 
indeterminism in the physical world.38 Others adopt a hard deterministic posi-
tion, according to which determinism is true and so excludes the possibility of 
free acts.39 It is not true, however, that every indeterministic position leaves free 
will uncompromised. If, for example, the fi xation of quantum indeterminacies 
were due to random movements, human action would not have its origin in a 
genuinely free decision.40 Leonardo Polo did not participate in this debate, but 
his transcendental anthropology also off ers a new perspective of analysis.41 Even 
though in philosophical tradition, ‘transcendental’ usually means what is most 
universal or transcategorial, Polo understands this concept as an act of being. In 
this context, he points out that the (act of ) being studied by metaphysics can-
not be the (act of ) being studied by anthropology. Th is is because metaphysics 
deals with being as a principle or foundation, and this meaning of being excludes 
freedom, since a dependent and founded freedom is something contradictory. 
Salvador Piá, one of Polo’s early followers, explains:
Polo proposes a transcendental distinction between metaphysics (understood as 
the study of the cosmos) and anthropology (understood as the study of the human 
being). Th ese two sciences study distinct types of acts of being; the former studies the 
act of being of the physical universe (that is, the act of persistence), while the latter 
studies the act of being of the human person (that is, the act of co-existence).42
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146 Latin American Perspectives on Science and Religion
Th ereby, if we follow the abandonment of the mental limit in order to know the 
human person, an anthropological extension of the traditional doctrine of the 
transcendentals becomes necessary. Polo proposes that freedom is a transcen-
dental of human person – that is to say – convertible with the personal act of 
being.43 Since indeterminism of physical reality and human freedom refer to real 
and transcendental principles of diff erent kinds, they are neither identifi ed nor 
mutually implied in a direct way.
Conclusion
Th e question of determinism/indeterminism in nature, in the past century, has 
materialized in a novel way in physics (quantum mechanics, theory of chaos); 
biology (theory of evolution, biology of development, system biology); and 
in the neurosciences (the problem of freedom). Th rough science, a new inde-
terministic paradigm has been gradually introduced to philosophical and 
theological refl ections, changing the world vision and infl uencing the specifi c 
aims of scientifi c research.
To address these and similar issues, it seems desirable to cross systemati-
cally the borders of what is traditionally considered scientifi c, philosophical or 
theological, in order to face the specifi c challenge of attaining interdisciplinary 
understanding and a common technical vocabulary that promotes a dialogue 
between diff erent disciplines. Nevertheless, this dialogue must be developed 
with care. On the one hand, it is important to avoid an incorrect transposi-
tion of the ontological, gnoseological and epistemological levels, because that 
could lead to confusion. On the other hand, in order to avoid reductionism, we 
should not consider any of these levels as unique or absolute. Th e methodologi-
cal proposal of the abandonment of the mental limit, which I have very briefl y 
presented in this chapter, entails a deep renunciation of any form of monism and 
of the kind of uniqueness that results from resting at an objectifi cation. But if 
we accept that operative knowledge – which is abstractive and objectifying – is 
neither the only nor the supreme kind of knowledge, it is possible – according 
to Polo – to leave uniqueness in search of other ways of accessing physical and 
metaphysical reality and, above all, what is intrinsically human.
In my opinion, Polo’s philosophical proposal off ers a radical anti-reduction-
ist answer: science’s objectifying way of thinking is not the only possible way of 
knowing. Knowledge is wider than thought, since thought is a specifi c kind of 
knowledge. Polo’s philosophy off ers many suggestive insights but, since his writ-
ings still contain many unexplored aspects, it is still too early to pass a judgement 
on its capacity to participate in contemporary debates with clarifying answers 
that also encourage its continuation.
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